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Abstract 
The general use of subjective probabilities to 
model belief has been justified using many 
axiomatic schemes. For example, 'consistent 
betting behavior' arguments are well-known. 
To those not already convinced of the unique 
fitness and generality of probability models. 
such justifications are often unconvincing. 
The present paper explores another rationale 
for probability models. 'Qualitative 
probability; which is known to provide 
stringent constraints on belief representation 
schemes, is derived from five simple 
assumptions about relationships among 
beliefs. While counterparts of fan:illiar 
rationality concepts such as transitivity, 
dominance, and consistency are used, the 
betting context is avoided . The gap between 
qualitative probability and probability proper 
can be bridged by any of several additional 
assumptions. The discussion here relies on 
results common in the recent AI literature, 
introducing a sixth simple assumption. The 
narrative emphasizes models based on unique 
complete orderings, but the rationale extends 
easily to motivate set-valued representations 
of partial orderings as well. 
I INTRODUCilON 
Many probabilists assert that subjective probabilities 
provide a generally useful foundation for the modeling 
of beliefs in all situations. That is, belief strengths are 
(or ought to be) realistically depicted as probability 
distributions. and that the strengths change in the face 
of evidence according to Bayes' formula. 
Non-probabilists naturally take issue, some denying 
not only the generality of probability, but the 
generality of aJIY single formalism (e.g. Smets 1991). 
Since there seems to be no controversy that probability 
models are sometimes useful. a natural question is 
where the frontiers of their usefulness might lie. 
An old prescriptive argument that there are no 
frontiers, the pignic motivation (DeFinetti 1937, 
Savage 1972), appeals to consistency in betting 
behavior. This line of argument can be sidestepped 
fairly readily, as both Shafer and Zadeh have (in 
discussions of Lindley 1982), by noting that betting 
isn't the same as believing. 
Another line of argument might be called 
mathematical inevitability (Cox 1946, Horvitz et aJ. 
1986). Assuming that some scalar measure of belief 
strength exists, one enumerates mathematical 
properties that any such measure should have. The 
quality of this argument is quite different from the 
pignic. The point isn't so much that one ought to use 
probabilities, but rather that there is effectively no 
choice. Inevitability also opens the door to set-valued 
models (an ensemble of probability distributions not 
ruled out by the believer. advocated by such as Levi. 
1980 and Kyburg 1987); the pignic position insists that 
there be only one probability distribution. 
Nevertheless, like any axiomatic system, inevitability 
can be countered by denying that one or more of the 
suggested mathematical properties is apodictic. Dubois 
and Pra.de (1988) have argued this position well. 
A third approach observes that objective probabilities 
are known for some uncertain propositions. If the 
believer orders the propositions in one's corpus of 
beliefs, and some of those beliefs are represented by 
objective probabilities, then subjective probabilities 
can model all of the ordered beliefs. This notion 
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receives axiomatic treatment in Villegas (1964) and 
DeGroot (1970). This approach can be defeated by 
asserting that the believer is simply unwilling. or 
computationally unable, to create such an ordering in 
all cases of interest. 
This paper borrows ideas from all three approaches to 
arrive at a new and simple motivation for probabilism. 
Five basic assumptions about ordered beliefs are 
developed, leading to a motivation of 'qualitative 
probability' models. From there to ordinary 
probability run many paths often trod in an extensive 
literature. We shall explore an inevitability route, in the 
course of which a sixth assumption is introduced . A 
fmal note adapts the results developed for a single 
complete ordering of beliefs to models involving 
partial orderings. 
2 ASSUMPTIONS FO:R 
QUALITATIVE PR.OBABILffiES 
Let us assume that the believer has an ordering r ( ) 
defmed over a fmite number of atomic sentences of 
interest and their Boolean combinations, including the 
always true sentence (T) and the always false sentence 
(F). We assume the following about r ( ): 
A 1. r ( ) is a complete transitive ordering. 
A2. r (T) > r (F). 
A3. For all sentences a in the ordering, 
r (1) >== r (a) >= r (F) 
with equality obtaining if and only if a is asserted to be 
certainly true or certainly false. 
A4. For any sentences a and b, and any c where 
r(T) > r(c) > r(F) 
if 
r (al c) >= r (b I c) and r (al-e) >= r (b 1 -c) 
then 
r(e.) >= r(b) 
and if either antecedent inequality is strict, then so is 
the consequent. 
AS. For all sentences a, b, and c, 
r(alc) >= r(blc) 
if and only if 
r (a and e) >= r (b and c). 
In all these assumptions, the inequality symbols and 
the 'given stroke' are defined in the usual ways. 
(Throughout, we shall consider the conditioning 
operation as invalid for 'given' sentences ordered 
equally with F). As stated, these assumptions lead to a 
discussion of belief models based upon a single belief 
ordering. In a later section, we shall modify these 
assumptions to support sets of orderings in the interest 
of motivating set-valued probability models. 
The fourth assumption can be motivated as a kind of 
dominance principle, specialized here to the belief 
context rather than to the gambling context (but still 
within the spirit of Savage, 1972). The force of the 
argument is that since we believe that a is no less 
credible than b if c is true, and believe the same if c is 
false, and those are the only two possibilities, then our 
prior ordering should favor a over b. 
The flfth assumption was taken from DeGroot (1970). 
In addition to the use we shall make of it here, AS 
underlies DeGroot's motivation of Bayesian revision 
given that there is some probability distribution p ( ) 
which represents r ( ). Indeed, AS is a straightforward 
statement of the Bayesian intuition about what it 
means for evidence to favor one proposition over 
another. 
Theorem. For sentences a, b, and c where 
a and c and b and c are both false. then 
t (a or c) >= r (b or c) 
if and only if 
r (a) >= t (b). 
Proo[ Note that if c is asserted to be false, 
then the equivalence is immediate. 
(1) From the contrapositive of the weak 
inequality portion of A4 and from the easily 
derived r (a or c I c) == t (b or c I c) = r (T), it 
follows that if r (a or c) > r (b or c), then 
r (a or c I -c) > r (b or c I -c), and thus, by 
application of the assumption AS, 
r ( (a or c) and -c) > t ( (b or c) and -c), or 
simply r (a) > r (b). 
(2) Similarly, by the strict inequality portion 
of A4, if r (a or c) = r (b or c), then 
r (a or c I -c) cannot be strictly greater nor 
strictly less than r (b or c 1 "1:), and so by AS 
again, we concluder (a) = r (b). 
(1) and (2) are the 'only if' portion; the 
contrapositive of(l) is the 'ir portion. II 
The usual definition of qualitativr: probability 
comprises Al, A2, A3, and the theorem. Thus, we 
conclude that ordering r ()is a qualitative probability. 
We now seek conditions under which there exists some 
probability distribution p ( ) which agrees with r ( ), 
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that is, for all sentences a, b in the ordering. 
r (a)>= r (b) if and only ifp (a)>= p (b). 
3 FllOM QUALITATIVE TO 
ORDINARY PRO BABILITY 
Fishburn and Roberts (1989) review some of the 
literature on the additional assumptions needed for a 
qualitative probability on a futite domain to have an 
agreeing probability distribution. If there are four or 
fewer mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
propositions of interest, then an agreeing probability 
distribution exists without further assumptions (Kraft 
et al., I959). For practical work., of course, something 
more general is needed. 
For an AI audience, it may be interesting to look at the 
qu�on in light of the results of Horvitz, et aJ. (1986), 
which results are well-known in the AI literature. 
These authors showed that if a scalar measure suffices 
to represent the degree of belief (and an index on the 
finite ordering satisfies that), then the scalar is an 
increasing transformation of some probability 
distribution provided that, in our notation: 
HI. for all sentences a and b, 
r (a) >= r (b) implies r (-a) =< r (-b). 
H2. For all sentences a, b, c, r (a and b 1 c) is a strictly 
increasing function of r (a I b and c) and of r (b 1 c) 
when the other is held constant. 
Assumption HI, sometimes called complemeJJtarity, 
has been criticized on intuitive grounds by Dubois and 
Prade (1988). It is, however, proven that every 
qualitative probability exhibits C()mplementarity 
(Kraft, et al., 1959). 
Assumption H2, despite its relative complexity, is often 
presented as intuitively reasonable in its own right. 
However, Dubois and Prade (1990) have noted that if 
H2 is amended to read weakly increasing instead of 
stricdy increasing. then the necessity of probability 
measures doesn't follow from H 1 and the amended 
H2. This observation has great force if weakly 
increasing relationships serve the intuition underlying 
H2 as well as strictly increasing relationships do. 
There is no way to resolve a clash of intuitions, but it 
may be helpful to derive H2 from other, simpler 
assumptions. That way, at least, further discussion is 
narrowed. We proceed by introducing a new 
assumption to the five already made, a specialized 
"chain rule": 
A6. For all sentences x, y, and z in the ordering such 
that x implies y and y implies z, r (x 1 z) is a strictly 
increasing function of r (x I y) and of r (y 1 z) when 
the other is held constant. 
We then note the following corollary of assumption 
A5: 
r (b I a) = r (b and a 1 a ) 
Apart from its logical status, the corollary makes 
sense: if we learned that a was true, then our opinion 
about b would presumably coincide with our opinion 
about the conjunction of b and the 
now-known-to-be-true a. From these we offer the 
following proof of H2: 
Proof. In A6, let x = a and b and c, 
y = b and c, and z = c; x implies y implies z as 
required. The substitution into A6 asserts that 
r (a and b and c f c) is increasing in 
r (a and b and c 1 b and c) and in 
r (b and c I c). By the corollary, these three 
quantities can be rewritten to read 
respectively, r (a and b I c), r (a I band c): 
and r (b I c), which yields the text of H2JI 
Thus, the present assumptions Al through A6 imply 
Horvitz et al.'s HI and H2, leading to the conclusion 
that there is at least one ordinary probability 
distribution which agrees with the ordering r ( ). 
4 ANO TEON SET-VALUED 
MODELS 
While many fmd the notion of ordered belief 
intuitively plausible, many also fmd the notion of a 
complete ordering implausible. On computational 
grounds, there are a lot of beliefs to order. Further 
there is no room for modesty in a complete ordering; 
perhaps the believer simply doesn't know enough to 
rank confidently the sentence 'it will rain tomorrow in 
Boston' against 'traffic will be heavy in Boston 
tomorrow nittht.' Indeed, a frequently-heard rejoinder 
to the pignic motivation of probability (and others 
which insist that only a single probability distribution 
will do) is that complete orderings are often 
psycholopically unrealistic and prattmatically 
burdensome. 
Only simple modifications of the earlier arguments are 
needed to support set-valued probability models of 
partially ordered beliefs. A convenient starting point 
for such a model is the set of all belief orderings not 
ruled out by either the beliefs actually held or by the 
3SSUmptions AI through A5. 
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Each member of the set would be a qualitative 
probability. If A6 (or any of the other 'bridging' 
assumptions studied in the literature) holds, then each 
member would be an increasing transform of one or 
more probability distributions. The fmal model would 
be the set of all probability distributions which agree 
with at least one ordering in the set of qualitative 
probabilities. Beliefs would be modeled by this 
arrangement in the sense of unanimous agreement, 
that is 
r ( a ) >= r ( b ) in all orderings 
if and only if 
p ( a ) >= p ( b ) in all distributions 
Such a model satisfies a simple generalization of the 
minimum plausible requirements for belief models 
identified by Prade (1985), namely 
p (F)=O 
p(T)=I 
if a implies b, then p (a) =< p (b) 
since all probability distributions, and hence each 
distribution in the model set, display these properties. 
Of course, the distributions would not always agree on 
particular values for p (a) and p (b), although they 
would agree on the inequality; hence the need to 
somewhat generalize Prade's criteria. 
S CONCLUSIONS 
There is no possibility that the enumeration of any set 
of axioms will confound the non-believers. nor is it 
necessary to the su<X:eSS of the probabilist program 
that other scholars quietly leave the field. On the 
contrary, the criticisms of Zadeh, Dempster and 
Shafer, and many others of like mind spur the 
development and evolution of probabilist ideas. 
Probabilists who favor set-valued models, for instance, 
owe a debt to these non-probabilists for their critique 
of the pignic approach to belief modelling. 
One use of an axiomatic exercise is to get beyond 
theories of 'brainwashing' as the source of probabilist 
scholarship, and to move the debate on to more 
profitable subjects. For example, axioms can be helpful 
when some uncertainty calculus yields a distinctly 
different answer from what any probability model 
would yield. Does a probabilist have a license to object 
that the other calculus is 'wrong'? Axioms have a role 
in clarifying what is at stake in a difference between 
approaches. even if axioms cannot settle any clash of 
intuitions that the difference reveals. 
Even so, it must be admitted that the lively rivalry 
between the probabilists and some others may be 
much ado about the difference between two wrong 
answers. Anand (1987), for one, questions the 
generality of the notion of ordered belief. Perhaps 
what is really going on sometimes, he argues, is more 
like an athletic league. 'Teams' (sentences) compete for 
top honors, and any ordering is transitory with little 
relevance to how future 'contests' (i.e., what will 
happen when new evidence is seen) will turn out. 
Further, there may be questions about the experience 
of uncertainty that go beyond the ordering of 
sentences, even if it is uncontroversial that such an 
ordering exists. For example, Shackle (1949) considers 
the cognitive phenomenon of surprise. While it may be 
the case that probabilistic models of such a 
phenomenon can be built, and that probability 
principles may constrain what models are acceptable, 
nevertheless, the phenomenon goes beyond the issues 
usually addressed by probability. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that Shackle proposes a model which 
lacks any explicit probability content. 
More recently, Hsia (1991) has modeled surprise using 
the Dempster-Shafer formalism. Hsia's work is 
especially interesting because he asks whether D-S 
might be capturing an aspect of the experience of 
uncertainty which is distinct from the aspect on which 
Bayesians usually focus. 
Let us fmish by returning to the question of where the 
frontiers of probabilism's usefulness might lie, first 
raised in the introduction . The gist of the axioms 
presented here is that probability models are 
appropriate whenever (1) the believer subscribes to 
certmn constraints about how sentences may be 
ordered in 'belief-worthiness', (2) the believer 
subscribes to certain constraints about how such an 
ordering would change if evidence were observed, and 
(3) the objective of the model is to represent the 
orderings that are subject to these constraints and to 
constraints imposed by the actual beliefs themselves. 
No claim is made that the constraints of (1) and (2) are 
shared by all believers with respect to all beliefs, nor 
that they ought to be. No claim is made that all aspects 
of the experience of uncertainty are necessarily 
manifestations of such a constrained belief ordering. 
What is claimed is that many believers do acknowledge 
such constraints, and that many aspects of the 
uncertainty experience are manifestations of an 
ordering of beliefs. 
What the axioms allow, then, is a formal 
demonstration that for such a believer and for a 
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question about such an aspect of uncertainty, a 
probability model is required to do justice to both the 
constraints and the beliefs. (That does not rule out. of 
course. the possibility that some other method might 
furnish satisfactory service as an approximation tooL) 
A further goal is to state the constraints simply, so that 
discussion about what a believer subscribes to, and 
about what the problem in question is about. can 
proceed easily. 
Axioms like those presented here serve to stake out a 
claim about the scope of a method. Whether that 
amounts to all occasions of uncertain reasoning or not, 
simple and explicit articulation of the boundaries of a 
claim is desirable in itself. As the poet Robert Frost 
remarked, good fences make good neighbors. 
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